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A NECESSARY DISENCHANTMENT: MYTH, AGENCY AND INJUSTICE IN A 
DIGITAL WORLD 
NICK COULDRY 
 
KEYWORDS 
Media institutions; social knowledge; myth; hermeneutics; social media platforms; big data 
 
Abstract 
This article reviews the history of how the status and authority of media institutions over the 
past century have been entangled with wider claims about social knowledge and the order of 
societies. It analyses those relations in terms of three successive and now overlapping myths: 
‘the myth of the mediated centre’ which claims that media (traditional mass media 
institutions) are privileged access points to our centre of social values and social reality; the 
‘myth of us’ which is now emerging around the supposedly natural collectivities that ‘we’ 
form on commercial social media platforms; and, from outside the media industries, the 
‘myth of Big Data’ which proclaims big data techniques are generating and entirely new and 
better form of social knowledge. All these myths require deconstruction by a particular 
hermeneutic, but the case of the myth of Big Data is the most paradoxical, since its claims 
amount to an anti-hermeneutic, a refusal to interpret the social anymore as the resultant of 
processes of meaning-making. This third myth, it is argued, requires a hermeneutic of the 
anti-hermeneutic if it is to be deconstructed and previous conceptions of social knowledge 
(from Weber onwards), and the claims to possible justice and politics based upon them, are to 
be preserved. 
 
Introduction 
I’m delighted to be back at LSE, and particularly its Department of Media and 
Communications, after seven years away. In marking my return, I want to give you some idea 
of how I’ve been thinking and researching about media and communications over the past 20 
years and of the themes that currently preoccupy me. I am interested in how certain 
institutions with concentrated power over the production and circulation of symbols (we’ve 
usually called them ‘media’) have for at least two centuries been bound up with our 
possibilities of knowing the social. By the term ‘social’, I mean the web of interrelationships 
and dependencies between human beings which are always, in part, relations of meaning.1  
 Media are institutions with particular power over the means for representing shared 
reality, reality that becomes recognised as ‘ours’, in part, through what media do. To grasp 
how this power works, we need to follow the larger stories about ‘society’ and the ‘social 
world’ that get told through and about our everyday uses of media. That means making 
media’s familiarity strange, and taking, as feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith (1987) put it, 
‘the everyday world as problematic’. In that spirit, I will use the language of anthropology to 
describe three ‘myths’ by which the relations between media and social knowledge have been 
framed and disguised. Myths that have emerged at different times but now overlap each 
other. I will call them ‘the myth of the mediated centre’, ‘the myth of “us”’ and ‘the myth of 
big data’ (that is, of big data as social knowledge). The institutions we usually call ‘media’ 
(television and radio companies, newspaper corporations) were central to the first myth, but 
are increasingly displaced in the production of the second and third, as centralized 
information and image flows (‘media’) becomes entangled with the building and sustaining 
of platforms for social interaction (such as Facebook, Twitter, Weibo) and with the 
continuous gathering of data about us whose value fuels those platforms and increasingly the 
whole of the media and cultural industries.  
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Calling these different processes ‘myths’ enables us to see an underlying pattern in 
how, as societies, we make sense of organizing things around assumptions that certain types 
of information, expertise and knowledge are more valuable than others, and offer us a 
privileged view on the reality of social life. I say ‘we’ because these myths are not merely an 
elite production: we are all, potentially, involved in producing these myths through our 
everyday actions (making ‘myth’ a more useful term, incidentally, than ‘ideology’). Each 
myth I have mentioned has a distinctive domain, a distinctive effect and a distinctive set of 
beneficiaries.  
To anticipate my story, the myth of the mediated centre has as its domain the 
organization of everyday life and resources around the productions of large media 
institutions. Its effect is to make sense of inclusive media-based social collectivities: 
historically, these have been focussed on national (sometimes regional) broadcasting 
territories. This myth has various beneficiaries: proximately, media institutions themselves; 
ultimately government (which needs large media to provide the means for assuming that it 
can still talk to its population) and advertisers, or least those advertisers still interested in 
buying access to whole populations or segments of them. The ‘myth of us’ has, as its domain, 
our activities of social interaction as registered by social media platforms; its effect is to 
underwrite the belief on which those platforms rely that this is where we now come together: 
the ‘us’ here is not necessarily national, it is just as easily transnational. This myth’s 
immediate beneficiaries are the platform owners, while the ultimate benefit passes to the 
institutions from government to marketers that want to remain in touch with us this way. The 
myth of big data is the strangest of the three myths I’ll discuss tonight, because it seems to 
have nothing to do with media institutions, and its operations are indeterminate in scale. Its 
domain is simply: everything – the entire extent of the data we generate as we live and 
interact. Its effect is to reinforce our belief that such data offer a new route to social 
knowledge as well. Its proximate beneficiaries are the new data mining and data analysis 
industry; its ultimate beneficiaries are businesses which want continuous marketing access to 
whatever we do, and states which are rethinking government as a version of total data access.  
Each such myth, by rationalizing a certain perspective on how we come to know the 
social, obscures our possibilities for imagining, describing and enacting the social otherwise. 
And each myth, to be unpacked, requires its own distinctive type of interpretation or 
hermeneutic. Which is where the special power of the myth of Big Data emerges, because it 
challenges the very idea that the social is something we can interpret at all. I’ll return to this 
anti-hermeneutic danger later, but for now I’ll recall a great philosopher, the late Bernard 
Williams, who articulated that danger poignantly in one of his last public lectures: ‘we run’, 
he said, ‘the risk that the whole humanities enterprise of trying to understand ourselves is 
coming to seem peculiar’. And yet, he wrote, ‘we all have an interest in the life of that study 
– not just a shared interest but an interest in [its being] a shared interest’ (2006: 198-99). 
Indeed that interest is integral to any notion of social understanding. 
 
The myth of the mediated centre 
But I am getting ahead of myself. Let me go back to the beginning of my story. What exactly 
do I mean by ‘media’? ‘Media’ are, first of all, technological means for producing, 
circulating and receiving communications. We would have no media unless human life were 
constituted, in a crucial respect, by communications: by the exchanges of signs that enable 
acts of communications to make sense, to accumulate over time as meaning, as knowledge. 
As Paul Ricoeur put it, ‘substituting signs for things . . . [is] more than a mere effect in social 
life. It is its very foundation’ (1980: 219).  
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It became essential however at a certain point in history to mark off the work of 
‘media’ infrastructures from the general flow of communications. This occurred when 
technological forms of communications emerged that could consistently and reliably transmit 
certain bundles of meaning across large territories.  Many would associate this with the start 
of large-scale printing in the 15th and 16th centuries in Europe.  
The notion of ‘the media’, in which I’ve been strongly interested in my work, 
emerged in the early 20th century (according to the OED) with the interconnected growth of 
the modern state, modern economy and modern media institutions: stable infrastructures and 
networks for the production and circulation of communication packages to a state’s whole 
population. The social theorist who paid most attention to these shifts was Gabriel Tarde 
(1969). Through newspapers, radio, film and television’s intensified forms of simultaneity, 
media gathered populations, or seemed to, in rituals of national attention that took initially 
quite curious forms such as in the UK the media event of the Oxford and Cambridge Boat 
Race: I still remember my mother wearing an Oxford blue ribbon on the race day (she had 
never been to university). Such rituals evolved into more stable genres such as the coronation 
(1953 in Britain, 1958 in Japan), the state funeral (1963 in the USA, 1965 in Britain), the 
sporting spectacle, and so on. 
Media institutions’ relations to social knowledge have been entangled from the start 
with the submerged categories, norms and exclusions through which some notion of national 
life or culture gets constituted. Understanding these relations means going beyond the 
analysis of particular media contents and production processes, and considering media 
institutions’ role in the stories we tell about ourselves, as members of a social domain, or 
indeed of a democratic one. Raymond Williams captured this in his 1974 inaugural Lecture at 
Cambridge when he wrote of the role of TV drama in providing ‘images, representations, of 
what living is now like’ (1975: 9) in societies that were becoming increasingly ‘opaque’. But 
it was a Latin American scholar, Jesus Martín-Barbero, who summed up most neatly the shift 
that a content-based media research must undergo to fulfil Williams’ core insight. He wrote a 
book called ‘From the Media to the Mediations’ (oddly the English edition relegated the 
Spanish main title to subtitle: Martín-Barbero 1993). And in Britain Roger Silverstone, 
founder of LSE’s Dept of Media and Communications, against the prevailing fashions in 
media research, argued for a wider view of the social and cultural processes that media 
constitute, which he called ‘mediation’.  
I have tried to maintain this tradition of thinking about media institutions’ 
consequences for social knowledge through the term ‘myth’ which I introduced a few 
minutes ago. I use the term the ‘myth of the mediated centre’ (Couldry 2003; 2012) to point 
to the long history whereby media institutions became increasingly implicated in the 
languages, practices and organizational logics of whole societies. This myth is what we might 
call a ‘reserve rationalization’ that makes sense of our organizing our lives around the content 
flows of media organizations; it tells us that society has a ‘centre’ of value, knowledge and 
meaning, and that particular institutions, those we call ‘media’, have a privileged role in 
giving us access to that supposed ‘centre’.  Media institutions work hard to sustain that myth, 
telling us we are all watching, that this programme or event shows ‘what’s going on’ for us as 
a society. So too do other institutions, such as governments and political parties, which 
depend on something like a mediated centre to underwrite their ‘space of appearances’. This 
is how media institutions’ symbolic power gets reproduced. Media have evolved elaborate 
categories of thought to express the myth of their centrality: for example, the language of 
‘liveness’ and celebrity, the greater value given to what’s “in” the media over what isn’t.  
But, as I have argued for a decade or so, we need to disenchant that language, not because it 
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is necessarily bad for us, but in order to grasp all the work done that keeps it in place, and 
sustains the particular perspective on social knowledge that it involves.2   
Paradoxically, my analysis has become less controversial as, with digital media, the 
plausibility of the myth of the mediated centre has in some ways declined! In the past 10 
years, it has become ever more obvious when media are telling us they are central to our lives 
and to society’s life, and why - because for some sectors such as the press, audiences have 
declined irreversibly, while traditional media must compete for our attention with so many 
other communication interfaces.  But the myth of the mediated centre still provides a useful 
reference-point to interpret the next media format that claims to offer a privileged standpoint 
on our shared ‘reality’. We still need that ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’.  
However such a hermeneutic is no longer enough to grasp what media are doing, and 
what we are now doing with media. It is not that ‘media’ have disappeared, or that media’s 
claims to be central have diminished – arguably those claims have become more insistent.3 It 
is rather that the whole terrain of media (and media institutions) has been reshaped by huge 
external forces. Fundamental has been what Rainie and Wellman (2012: ix) call the ‘triple 
revolution’ of 1) the internet as a personalized mode of one-to-one and many-to-many 
communication, 2) the continuous availability of both interpersonal and mass communication 
while on the move, and 3) the resulting intensification of social networking. A key tool for 
such networking has been ‘social media platforms’, such as Facebook. Social media are of 
fundamental importance to the myth of the mediated centre, because they offer a new form of 
centrality, a new social ‘liveness’, mediated apparently by us rather than by content-
producing media institutions. The implications for media as social institutions are profound. 
When we think about media today, we cannot sharply separate, as we once did, media 
infrastructure (for the centralized distribution of institutional content) from communications 
infrastructure (for distributed, interpersonal forms of communication). Both now flow into 
and over each other and across the same platforms.  
But there is no question of social media simply substituting for mass media 
institutions. Large-scale media content producers, and cultural industries linked to them such 
as advertising, are already closely involved in social media. Indeed, social media platforms, 
far from being an authentic social response to large media, represent an entirely new business 
model for media and communications infrastructures.  And, as this new way of organizing 
business and our lives around digital platforms becomes normalized, a new myth is emerging 
to make sense of this.   
 
The Myth of ‘us’ 
A new myth about the collectivities we form when we use platforms such as Facebook. An 
emerging myth of natural collectivity that is particularly seductive, because here traditional 
media institutions seem to drop out altogether from the picture: the story is focussed entirely 
on what ‘we’ do naturally, when we have the chance to keep in touch with each other, as of 
course we want to do. Charlotte Brunsdon and David Morley (1978) had a brilliant phrase for 
the myth of the mediated centre at its mass media peak in the late 1970s: the ‘nation now’. 
Today, when Facebook offers to ‘tell the story of our lives’, we have: ‘us now’.  Of course, 
this myth is not yet fully established: if the myth of the mediated centre took decades to 
become so, the myth of ‘us’ too will only fully stabilise over time. Nor am I the first to detect 
a mystification here: Christian Fuchs (2011) and Jose Van Dijck (2013) have brought out the 
competing norms at work in the proprietary business models of social media. We see the 
myth’s effects in accounts of political protests across the world in the past 3 years as Twitter 
or Facebook revolutions, or in the Guardian’s recent listing (1 September 2013, Media  
section) of ‘us’ as media personality of 2013. 
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But again, why talk of ‘myth’, why disenchant what so often is good fun? Because we 
must be wary when our most important moments of ‘coming together’ seem to be captured in 
what people happen to do on platforms whose economic value is based on generating just 
such an idea of natural collectivity. It would not be enough for Facebook, for example, to say 
that lots of small groups, unknown to each other, do roughly similar things behind virtual 
closed doors. It is vital to the value claims on which Facebook depends for it to open as many 
of those interconnecting doors as possible and claim that Facebook is what ‘we’ are now 
doing together. ‘We’, the collectivity of everyday people, everywhere. Vague as it is, this 
claim grounds any number of specific rhetorics and judgements about what’s happening, 
what’s trending, and so (by a self-accumulating logic) what matters: for government, society, 
business, and for us.  
The myth of ‘us’, however, because it is loosely focussed across vast platforms (in 
Facebook’s case of 1.1 billion users in over 200 countries), requires a special type of analysis. 
Foucault in his book The Archaeology of Knowledge used the term ‘system of dispersion’ for 
patterns of communication, documentation, and action that are rule-like across many different 
sites. He talks of ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (1972: 
49). Remember there is no collectivity, no ‘us’, of the sort we have come to talk about around 
social media, until those platforms attract ‘us’ (whoever we are) to use them, and link to 
them. The myth of ‘us’ is even less of a belief system than the myth of the mediated centre; it 
is more a basic form of orientation, what Andre Jansson (2013: 289) calls the ‘centripetal 
dynamic’ of always ‘checking in’, so routine that it requires not a hermeneutic of suspicion 
(there is often little to deconstruct) but a hermeneutic of tracking, tracking us as we perform 
the act of ‘being us’, on platforms that propose we do just that. 
But the myth of ‘us’ is spawning academic discourses that do need some 
deconstruction, some suspicion. Take Rainie and Wellman’s book Networked that I 
mentioned earlier, where they claim that we are witnessing the rise of ‘a different social order 
. . . [a] networked [social] operating system [that] gives people new ways to solve problems 
and meet social needs’ (2012: 8-9, added emphasis). ‘The new media’ they write ‘is the new 
neighbourhood’ (2012: 13). There are two problems with such language. First, rhetoric about 
the social does the work of analysis: what do these writers mean by ‘social’? does it relate to 
what we have meant by that word in the past? Second, such writing is silent about the other, 
possibly also social (or even anti-social), features of the territory across which this ‘us’ is 
gathered. The myth of ‘us’, like all myth, disguises the other knowledges it helps us lose 
along the way. So we need to dis-enchant such rhetorical claims about the new social world 
that platform-based networks make possible.  
One route to doing so is to think about the economics of such platforms. Social 
platforms benefit a very different type of advertiser from mass broadcasting. An advertiser 
who is concerned with reaching not big audiences gathering simultaneously at a particular 
place, but individuals tracked serially as they cross the media landscape, including on social 
media.  We all know that the tracking of our activity on social media sites is the basis of the 
value Facebook sells to advertisers and, indirectly, to the new data-mining industry that has 
emerged to create additional value out of that data. As Joseph Turow explains in his book The 
Daily You (Turow 2011), traditional media (to survive) must deal with this new industry, 
often offering their own data-gathering capacities to tempt potential advertisers. The ‘social’ 
at which media processes are targeted is being reconstructed all around us. In a video 
roadshow just before Facebook flotation’s last year, Mark Zuckerberg claimed Facebook is ‘a 
fabric that can make any experience online social’ (quoted Van Dijck 2013: 67), sounding 
more like a social theorist than many social theorists so-called. 
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The Myth of Big Data 
The value in this newly constructed social domain is unimaginable without a third myth, the 
myth of big data. Of course Big Data – the huge capacities of computer-based analysis now 
increasingly influencing science, corporate and governmental agendas - is not itself mythical. 
Massive computing capacity really is vital to discovering complex patterns in huge datasets, 
for example in the medical field; the servers that manage the flow of our everyday 
communications really do involve huge costs (on one estimate nearly $150 billion a year: 
Gartner quoted in Arthur (2013)); and there really is a practical problem of interpreting all the 
data now circulating (a recent Japanese film launch generated 150,000 tweets per second 
(Arthur 2013), so if you took 6-7 seconds to read and respond to any one, another million 
would already be there by the time you had finished!). But I’m interested here (as with the 
first two myths I discussed) in the claims now being made about what big data can achieve 
for understanding our world.  
Those claims matter, in part, because big data capacity is increasingly integrated into 
advertising and marketing in the form of the means to track vast numbers of individuals (data 
company Acxiom claims to track more than 700 million consumers globally): so big data 
affects the wider field where market-based media compete for funding. More broadly, ‘big 
data’ advocates’ claims about what counts as social knowledge affect all of us interested in 
producing social knowledge: whether in the media or in academic disciplines that research 
the social, as Mike Savage and Roger Burrows (2007) warned a few years back in an article 
called ‘The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology’.  Big data’s new ‘politics of 
measurement’ (in anthropologist James Scott’s phrase: 1998: 29) is changing the terrain on 
which all large institutions (including governments) can claim to tell us the way things are.  
I am not the first to talk of ‘myth’ in relation to big data. Tom Deutsch (2013), a 
commentator on IBMDataMag.com, wrote recently of the ‘vendor myths’ about the qualities 
or problems with particular types of big datasets. More deeply, Kate Crawford at MIT’s 
Center for Civic Media who with danah boyd has done so much to draw academic attention 
to the issues around big data (boyd and Crawford 2012), has spoken of the myths about the 
neutrality of big datasets and our chances of avoiding being identified by big data gatherers. 
As she noted, ‘big data is something we create, but it’s also something we imagine’ (quoted 
in Hardy 2013). Absolutely, and I’m concerned here with an even more wide-ranging act of 
imagination that connects big data practices to our very possibilities for social knowledge.  
Listen to Victor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier in their recent book Big 
Data: A Revolution that will Transform the Way We Live, Work and Think (2013). They 
celebrate the fact that, in response to the almost impossible challenge of making sense of the 
vast masses of data we can now collect, analysts are giving up on specific hypotheses and 
instead focussing on generating, through countless parallel calculations, ‘a really good proxy’ 
for whatever is associated with a phenomenon, and then relying on that as the predictor. 
Sometimes the proxy makes indirect interpretative sense: as in the controversial case where 
US retailer Target started communicating with a young woman on the basis she was 
pregnant, just because she had started buying a basket of consumer products that their 
predictive model associated with women who would shortly start buying pregnancy products. 
Sometimes however the proxy makes no interpretative sense at all, and indeed this is the 
authors’ point. This lack of sense doesn’t matter, they argue, because a really good proxy, 
once discovered, will help us see regularity across vast  numbers of variables that would 
otherwise be invisible. The result is to undercut the rationale of not just qualitative methods 
of analysis, but also of the interpretative models – the hermeneutics, if you like - that for 
decades have driven large-scale survey research. And, if we reject the very possibility of such 
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a hermeneutic, then we appear to disarm hermeneutic critique also, making the myth of Big 
Data armour-plated against criticism. 
So let’s follow this third myth in more detail. Myth works, as I’ve often argued 
following Maurice Bloch (1989) and Roland Barthes (1972), through ambiguity: through 
sometimes claiming to offer ‘truth’ and at other times to be merely playful, providing what, 
in the George W. Bush era, was called ‘plausible deniability’, but here at the level of claims 
about knowledge claims!  So Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier, on the one hand, say big data 
bring ‘an essential enrichment in human comprehension’ (2013: 96). They go further, 
proposing a large project of ‘datafication’ that involves quantifying every aspect of everyday 
phenomena to enable big data analysts to find its hidden order: the result will be ‘a great 
infrastructure project’ like Diderot’s 18th century encyclopedia: ‘this enormous treasure chest 
of datafied information . . . once analysed, will shed light on social dynamics at all levels, 
from the individual to society at large’ (2013: 93-94, emphasis added). The world too will 
look different: ‘we will no longer regard our world as a string of happenings that we explain 
as a natural or social phenomenon, but as a universe comprised essentially of information’ 
(2013: 96, emphasis added). On the other hand, when the moral consequences of acting on 
the basis of ‘big data’ arises - for example, arresting people for offences they are predicted to 
commit but haven’t yet - they back off and say that big data only provide probabilities, not 
actualities, and worry about ‘fetishizing the output of our [data] analysis’ (151).  
Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier’s is just one of many books making similarly 
mythical claims. A trailblazing article in 2007 by Wired magazine editor Chris Anderson 
called ‘The End of Theory’ (Anderson 2007) announced that access to ‘big data’ meant : ‘out 
with every theory of human behaviour, from linguistics to sociology. Forget taxonomy, 
ontology and psychology’. Why? Because the proxies that big data generate are good enough; 
or as Google’s research director put it, ‘you can succeed without them’. But success for who? 
For what purpose? In the service of whose or what notion of knowledge?  
Google’s clearly, and that of many other data-processing institutions big and small, 
but the unintended side-effects for the rest of us may be less positive. Writing about how 
governments’ understanding of, and decision-making, about its populations will increasingly 
rely on big data, Evelyn Ruppert suggests that we will all get used to being governed not on 
the basis of our individual features, but as ‘data doubles’ that ‘will supplant older notions of 
the general population’ (2011: 223): predictive strings that tell those who care what, say a 
man in his 50s with a certain educational background will do on a Thursday evening in 
November. And, as with all the myths I’ve discussed, we too are involved in its reproduction, 
supplying information (to government and countless other collectors, including social media 
platforms) about what we do, as we do it, allowing that information to supplant other possible 
types of information about ourselves, what we say, and how we reflect on our situation. 
Algorithmic practices are now, for example, at the core of states’ modes of managing border 
security risk, as geographer Louise Amoore (2011) shows. In development is a quite 
distinctive working model of ‘what human beings are’ that validates new types of evidence 
and expertise – and supplants other knowledges of our present and our futures.   
To disenchant this new myth, we need a new type of interpretation or hermeneutic: 
what paradoxically we might call ‘a hermeneutic of the anti-hermeneutic’. Judith Butler 
provides a clue to this when in her book Precarious Life, discussing how a media of 
excessive spectacle (too much showing) narrows our grasp of the human, she writes that 
‘there is less a dehumanizing discourse at work here than a refusal of discourse’ (2004: 36, 
added emphasis). It is the gaps and breaks in our languages of social interpretation, 
authorised by the myth of big data, on which we must focus. The CEO of a big-data-based 
sentiment analysis company, sounds reasonable when he says that ‘if we’re right 75% to 80% 
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of the time, we don’t care about any single story’ (quoted Andrejevic 2013: 56).4  But if the 
big data model works by equating our only forms of social knowledge with such 
probabilities, then we have already started organising things so that the single story – your 
story, my story - really doesn’t matter. That raises fundamental questions about individual 
voice, and the way voice is valued in our societies (a link back to another theme in my earlier 
work: Couldry 2010).  
The myth of big data is oriented to the social world differently from the other myths I 
have discussed. It does not have as its domain a national population, or even the particular 
collectivities that might gather online. It builds its population, data-bit by data-bit, through a 
series of operations that bypass earlier ideas of social interrelations. Its new form of ‘social 
knowledge’ splits up discourse populations: the groups that could once be talked about as 
populations for various purposes. It fractures the space of discourse, depicting its data 
subjects in ways that don’t connect any more with the space of action and thought in which 
actual individuals think they live; and it stretches the time of discourse, aggregating action-
fragments from any moment in the stream of a person’s recorded acts into patterns that bear 
little relationship to how those people themselves understand the sequence and meaning of 
their actions.  
Combine all this and mystify it through the myth of big data - and you risk replacing 
older ways of talking about the social world that can still be related to social actors with 
myriad data-strings that lack any elements that connect with how individuals, with 
recognisable sets of human aims and capabilities, make sense of what they do. And so, since 
hermeneutics (and the exchange of signs) is the basis of social life, in installing the Myth of 
Big Data into our working practices for generating and attributing knowledge, we risk 
unravelling the social itself, or at least the languages of social description on which not just 
sociology, but also justice and politics, have relied.5  We risk building a social landscape 
peopled by what the 19th century Russian novelist Nikolai Gogol (2004) called ‘dead souls’: 
human entities that have financial value (in his novel, if you remember, as mortgageable 
assets; in our new world, as unwitting data producers), but that are not alive, not at least in 
the sense we know human beings to be alive.   
And yet this transformation may not seem ‘peculiar’ to us (in Bernard Williams’ 
word), because we have become accustomed to giving accounts of ourselves in such data-
saturated ways on social networking sites and elsewhere; as such habits become established, 
we may lose the sense that our collective life could lie anywhere else than in such ‘datafied’ 
forms. And this matters not just to those, like me, with a vested interest in certain ways of 
talking about the social. It matters to all citizens – to all those who would be citizens – that 
corporate interests and increasingly the state too aspires to know us through big data. As John 
Lanchester put it in a fine article in the Guardian in October (Lanchester 2013), the 
surveillance capacities of the American and British states operate increasingly on the 
principle that ‘all they need is everything’.6 It would be a mistake to see the problem here as 
simply ‘the big, bad state’, and I am not concerned Prism and Tempora tonight. My point is 
that the myth of big data has already rationalized a state of affairs where a network of data-
gathering and data-amalgamating institutions has, or aspires to have, everything (what 
Acxiom calls ‘big marketing data’: Phil Mui, Acxiom’s chief technology officer, quoted Steel 
2013). As governments and corporations increasingly prioritise access to ‘big data’ in their 
visions of how they will govern or profit (or both), we are only a step away from the fact, not 
the myth, of continuous surveillance from all directions as the new basis of how societies and 
the world are ordered.7  
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So what can we do about this? It is not enough to simply reject the myth of big data. Jaron 
Lanier, the inventor of virtual reality in the 1990s, insists that ‘people’ [not algorithms] are 
‘the only sources or destinations of information’ (2013: 4). Absolutely, but, when a vast 
attempt is under way to build a different account of how and why people matter, it is not 
enough just to say that people matter. We need an alternative account of why knowledge 
about people matters for understanding the social, and indeed why ‘the social’ matters, if 
understood as more than just a probability set for predicting repeat action.  
Media institutions, as sites from which important claims about the social still get 
made, can surely make a positive contribution here. Yes, we can easily imagine media 
producing ‘reality games’ that convert big data proxies into entertaining prediction (a Reality 
TV format originally from Colombia that was built around a lie detector machine already 
anticipated that), but media, at their best, present us with the force of this person’s account of 
what happened to them, of how their life has gone: exemplary bodies and voices.  
Conversely, we should not assume that academic critique is always helpful. There is no room 
for hermeneutics, for example, in the anti-humanist analysis of media technologies developed 
by Friedrich Kittler, concerned only with media’s role in the ‘channelling of signals’ (Parikka 
2012: 69 on Kittler). Nor in social analysis based on ‘affect’ (such as Patricia Clough’s) 
which claims capitalism and data-based securitization have produced a world where 
‘preconscious’ ‘pre-individual’ ‘affect modulation’ is all there is (Clough 2009: 50, 48). Such 
analysis, by abandoning any language for interpreting what human subjects mean by their 
action, condemns us, like sleepwalkers, to submit to such changes.8 
Indeed I am troubled by the misalignment of ‘social imaginaries’ (Charles Taylor’s 
term: Taylor 2005) implied by today’s competing accounts of how we get to know our shared 
world. Some critical theory operates with a social imaginary that fits perfectly well with the 
imaginings of big data discourse (by renouncing any claim to interpret social meaning), but in 
the process loses touch with the imaginary that was for so long social science’s starting-point: 
Weber’s account of sociology as the ‘science which attempts the interpretative understanding 
of social action’ (1947: 88).9 As my colleague Robin Mansell (2012) argues in her book 
Imagining the Internet, we cannot move beyond such misalignments, unless we build new 
imaginaries - or at least, renew our hold on old ones. Challenging the myth of big data – a 
myth in which mass media and social media, the focus of my first two myths, are increasingly 
implicated and in which states and corporations are investing on a massive scale – this means 
reaffirming in some version the hermeneutic principles of that Weberian model of social 
science (otherwise social science risks being washed away with the ‘end of theory’).10 And it 
means reconnecting this hermeneutic principle with the genuine excitement today about what 
access to very large datasets, if differently thought about and interpreted, might mean for the 
future of social science and for citizens.  
 
Conclusion: Agency and Injustice in the Digital Age 
I want to end by discussing the implications of all this for two specific domains: agency and 
injustice. First, agency, by which I mean not brute acts (of clicking on this button, pressing 
‘like’ to this post) but (following Weber) the longer processes of action based on reflection, 
giving an account of what one has done, even more basically, making sense of the world so 
as to act within it. It is easy to give up on agency in a world where so many of our acts are 
fed into predictive models that have no interest in meaning. And one response to the rise of 
big data is to argue that, regrettably, all agency has now been subsumed by ‘algorithmic 
power’ (Lash 2007). But this confuses big data discourse’s mythical vision of a ready-to-be-
datafied universe for the messier world we live in. New forms of agency are emerging that do 
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not ignore the seeming inevitability today of being watched and counted, but address and deal 
with them.  
The starting-points for a hermeneutics of the social world are, in key ways, being 
transformed by big data and by the embedding of algorithmic calculation in the everyday, and 
we need a new type of social research to address this. I call this research ‘social analytics’: 
that is, the study of how social actors are themselves using analytics  - data measures of all 
kinds, including those they have developed or customised – to meet their own ends, for 
example, by interpreting the world and their actions in new ways. As Jannis Kallinikos 
(2009) points out, data only becomes information when it is interpreted, when it passes 
through hermeneutics. In a world that is starting to be shaped by the myth of big data, ‘social 
analytics’ tracks alternative projects of self-knowledge, group knowledge, institutional 
knowledge -  whose ends are not the tracking of data for its own sake, or even for profit, but 
for broader social, civic, cultural or political goals. It also tracks people’s practices of 
resisting the introduction of analytics-based tools as default forms of management or 
evaluation. Conversely, it tracks those who are using analytics, even Big Data, to build new 
forms of civic and social action, for example to govern cities.  
The idea of social analytics emerged from the Storycircle project that I led until this 
summer at Goldsmiths,  particularly a project we did with a community reporter organization 
in the north of England.11 It struck us that in the digital world being an organization with 
social ends - where ‘to be’ is already ‘to be measured’ - is challenging, a challenge of 
sociological interest to those of us still concerned with ‘meaningfully oriented behaviour’. 
For there - in how organizations gather data about their websites’ workings, how they think 
about metadata and its uses, and reflect on how, as organizations, they might change in 
response to such information – there, in raw form, are everyday battles to make sense of a 
data-saturated world in terms of social actors’ own goals, not data production alone.  
So a world of algorithmic power may, if we pay attention, reveal new forms of 
interpretive agency, and not just for the massively powerful, but it also involves distinctive 
forms of injustice. All the myths I have discussed tonight rationalize massive concentrations 
of symbolic resource; all therefore involve injustice of a sort. Such injustices are difficult to 
name, precisely because they involve concentrations of power over the resources for naming. 
But the injustices associated with the myths I have discussed play out differently. The power 
asymmetries involved in ‘mediated centres’ are so embedded in the organization of 
modernity and its spaces for claiming justice that it is difficult now to see how we can operate 
without them; indeed, when genuine injustices occur through the operations of mass media 
(the UK phone-hacking scandals), they are difficult to resolve. But the injustices associated 
with the newer myths of us and of Big Data may have even more fundamental consequences 
for the longer term.  
Take the digital infrastructure on which both social media and Big Data collection 
depend. As US legal scholar Julie Cohen notes, we all increasingly operate in our daily lives 
in ‘networked space’ but ‘the configuration of networked space is . . . increasingly opaque to 
its users’ (2012: 202). Indeed, she argues, today’s web of protocols and passwords, data 
requirements and data monitoring, has created ‘a system of governance that is authoritarian’, 
in the sense that there seems little alternative but to comply with it. And here, at the 
intersection between the desire to do just what we ordinarily do, and a new information 
sector’s need to track us across this ‘datafied’ space of appearances – here a vast power 
asymmetry is emerging that would not, I suspect, be tolerated if it were exclusively state 
power that was benefiting. But, as I noted earlier, we cannot easily prevent the state seeking 
to benefit from the big-data-gathering infrastructure.  
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Meanwhile the big data myth itself risks installing, as common sense, a way of 
thinking about human action that undermines the very languages through which we talk about 
justice and injustice. Why? Because the myth of Big Data’s version of social knowledge 
lacks any interpretative language from which comparisons of how things stand for different 
individuals might be built. Here we return by another route to the fundamental link between 
communication, the social, and the institutions that acquire dominant power over our 
accounts of social knowledge. In Amartya Sen’s recent reworking of the theory of justice, 
communication is the site where the lifeworld comparisons that ground claims for injustice 
get made. As Sen puts it at the end of The Idea of Justice, ‘it is bad enough that the world in 
which we live has so much deprivation of one kind or another . . . it would be even more 
terrible if we were not able to communicate, respond, and altercate’ (2009: 415). And yet 
through the myth of Big Data we are starting to give credence to a working model of social 
knowledge that operates as if the explanation of human action, and the processes of meaning-
making on which such explanation has relied, don’t matter any more. As Chris Anderson put 
it: ‘who knows why people do what they do? The point is they do it’. While this earthy 
pragmatism has a certain charm, it turns its back on the hermeneutics that remains 
fundamental to our best understanding of social science. Big data rhetoric is the latest 
example of what philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer once called ‘the alienation of the 
interpreter from the interpreted’ (2004 [1975]: 312): I simply don’t believe that Chris 
Anderson doesn’t care why he does what he does. 
It is always tempting however to think that the latest large claims for ‘social’ 
knowledge are absolutely new, and so must this time change humankind’s possibilities for a 
good life, once and for all. The history of new media and communications technologies is 
littered with such predictions. Indeed we can find echoes in Big Data discourse of a problem 
that Friedrich Schiller captured 2 centuries ago in his comments on earlier languages of state-
building: ‘the State remains for ever a stranger to its citizens since at no point does it ever 
make contact with their feeling. Forced to resort to classification in order to cope with the 
variety of its citizens, and never to get an impression of humanity except through 
representation at second hand, the governing sector ends up by losing sight of them 
altogether, confusing their concrete reality with a mere construct of the intellect; while the 
governed cannot but receive with indifference laws which are scarcely, if at all, directed to 
them as persons’ (1967 [o.p. 1795]: 37). 
As Schiller saw, a polity based on an impoverished model of the human subject 
cannot expect much loyalty from, or legitimacy with, those it governs. The warning holds, 
whether it is governments or dense networks of corporations that are promoting the ‘construct 
of the intellect’ in question. The right response is not, of course, to walk away from the 
challenges and opportunities to which today’s new forms of social interconnection and 
information generation give rise, but instead to make sure that, in facing those challenges and 
thinking creatively about those opportunities, we take care to hold on to our richer accounts 
of human agency and knowledge, and to the sense of possible democratic agency and 
possible justice whose basic components they supply. That is what, for me at least, is at stake 
in the work on our changing infrastructures of media, communications and information that I 
want to do here at LSE in the coming years.  
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1
 I draw implicitly throughout on William Sewell’s (2005) approach to ‘the social’ which is both materialist and  
constructivist, that is, it takes seriously the effectiveness of materially-based processes of social construction.  
Within this perspective, ‘the social’ is not defined by reference to the unit of national society, nor to ‘some  
“really real”’ underlying all social relations, but rather to ‘the various mediations that place people into “social”  
relations with one another’ (2005: 326, 329). In the last sense only is the term ‘social’ needed, indeed it is  
indispensable. On this view, the ‘complex interdependence of human interrelationships that we call the social’  
can only be understood through two contrasting metaphors, that of ‘language game’ and ‘built environment’  
(2005: 365). This position is, I believe, quite compatible with the insights, for example, of Actor Network  
Theory and Bruno Latour’s materially-based focus on ‘the progressive composition of the common world’  
(2004: 244), in spite of Latour’s own scepticism  (2005) about the term ‘social’.  
2
 In talking of ‘disenchantment’, I am looking back to Weber’s claim (Weber 1991: 155) that the modern age is  
one of inevitable disenchantment, a loss of divine reference-points. Maybe, but some new forms of  
disenchantment discussed here are now needed, and they will involve not loss, but gain.  
3
 Graeme Turner (2010) makes s similar argument. 
4
 The underlying source is Jeff Catlin, the CEO of Lexalytics Inc., quoted by Sisk (2009).  
5
 This unravelling, it is worth emphasising, dissipates not only any notion of the individual, but also any notion  
of the sense-making relationships between individuals (that is, is relational individuals) out of which the ‘social  
in Sewell’s sense is made up. A ‘social’ ontology built merely by aggregating data detached from both  
individuals and the mutual relations through which they are, largely, formed is not a social ontology at all, but  
an elaborated and reified refusal of the social which, following Butler, requires a hermeneutic of its  
own anti-hermeneutic. 
6
 This phrase does not appear in the online edition of this article, but was a subheadline on page 36 of the 
London hard copy edition. Thanks to Tarleton Gillespie to alerting me to the need for this clarification. 
7
 Since I wrote this, I have read Dave Eggers’ novel The Circle (2013) which gives this vision a nightmarish  
novelistic form. 
8
 See for a powerful critique of the misguided ‘radicalism’ of much writing on ‘affect’, Leys (2011). 
9
 It follow that what Paul Ricoeur, in a dialogue with neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux called the ‘semantic  
gap’ between natural sciences (including neuroscience) and philosophical phenomenology (and any social  
science based upon it) should be defended, not collapsed, which is not to deny that renewed social science in  
interest in brain science is welcome (Ricoeur in Ricoeur and Changeux 2000: 28). 
10
 I say ‘in some version’ because the challenge of Actor Network Theory and Bruno Latour’s profound  
rethinking of human relations to technology clearly requires some adjustment to Weber’s hermeneutic principles  
(see also note 1). 
11
 www.storycircle.co.uk. Researchers: Nick Couldry, Richard MacDonald, Wilma Clark, Luke Dickens, Aristea  
Fotopoulou, Hilde Stephansen. Funded by the UK Digital Economy programme (EPSRC/AHRC, grant  
EP/H0003738/1). 
